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Introduction
World trade(2)fell three times between World War II and 2008
(1958, 1975 and 1982), but the speed and severity of 2009’s
collapse was much more dramatic (Chart 1).(3) World trade
started to fall at the end of 2008 and by the first quarter of
2009 the pace of decline was fast enough to allow worrying
comparisons with the collapse in trade during the
Great Depression.(4) Fortunately, the second half of 2009 saw
enough of a recovery in world trade to allay the worst fears.
But even by April 2010 trade remained 5% below its
April 2008 peak and 17% below what it would have been had
it continued to grow at its pre-crisis average rate.(5)
The trade collapse is more remarkable when compared with
the, nonetheless, significant declines seen in both world GDP
and world industrial production.  By the second quarter of
2009, world GDP had fallen by around 3% on a year earlier
and world industrial production had fallen by around 10%,
while world trade had fallen by over 18% (Chart 2).  Although
world trade has tended to be more cyclical than world output
in the past, the past relationship would suggest a fall in trade
of around two times more than GDP rather than the six times
larger fall seen in 2009.  And it is this extent of the trade
decline that has been the focus of debate.
Of the causes used to explain the trade collapse, most fall into
one of two broad groups.  First are those explanations focusing
on how global trade patterns and global production processes
have changed over time, arguably making world trade today
inherently more volatile than world GDP, relative to the past.
Second are the arguments focusing on how the specific nature
of the global recession, following the financial crisis of 2008,
may have had an especially large impact on world trade.
World trade’s dramatic collapse from the end of 2008 was emblematic of a globally synchronised
recession that threatened to become a depression and of a financial crisis painfully transmitted to
the real economy.  The extent of the fall in world trade relative to that in world GDP and the
subsequent strength of the trade recovery so far suggests particular factors have been affecting
global trade flows.  This article considers the possible reasons for the pronounced fall and recovery in
world trade relative to world GDP, focusing on UK export demand.  At its core, the extraordinary
decline in trade stemmed from the combination of a shock to global demand skewed towards highly
tradable sectors and the ever-more globalised production process for these goods.  The encouraging
improvement in world trade from the second half of 2009 can also be attributed to some of these
factors, as well as suggesting that permanent damage to the global marketplace may be less
extensive than first feared.
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Sources:  Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) for 1930–38, World Trade Organisation for 1951–79,
IMF for 1980–2009 and Bank calculations.
(a) Market exchange rate weighted export volumes.  IMF series covers goods and services, other
series cover goods only.  Final data point refers to 2009.
(b) 1930 growth rate covers June-December 1930 relative to June-December 1929.  1938 growth
rate covers January-August 1938 relative to January-August 1937.
(1) The authors would like to thank Marco Stringa and Merxe Tudela for their help in
producing this article.
(2) Defined in this article as world imports, unless stated otherwise.
(3) A rare few studies, such as Benassy-Quere et al (2009), have argued that estimated
real trade declines may be overstated because of the use of inappropriate price
deflators.  But others, such as Francois and Woerz (2009), show that even with
detailed analysis of real and nominal numbers, real trade falls were very large.
(4) Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009).
(5) Based on monthly world goods imports data produced by CPB Netherlands,
August 2010 vintage.  Pre-crisis period defined as the ten years before April 2008.184 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
This article discusses the possible explanations for the severity
of the fall in world trade put forward by the recent literature
and Bank staff analysis.  It then uses a quantitative approach to
assess the importance of some of those explanations in
understanding the pattern of world trade recently,
concentrating on demand in the United Kingdom’s major
export markets.
What might be possible explanations for the
large fall in world trade relative to GDP?
(i)  The changing structure of world trade
World trade has grown faster than world GDP in both real and
nominal terms, at least since the end of the Second World War
and even more rapidly since the 1980s (Chart 3).  A basic
measure of the elasticity of trade relative to GDP, following
from the work of Irwin (2002),(1) shows that since the late
1980s changes in OECD GDP have been associated with larger
changes in OECD trade, than in earlier decades (Table A).
A previous Bulletin article(2) identified two main reasons
behind the faster growth in world trade relative to GDP
between 1980 and 2000.  First, prices of tradable goods had
tended to fall by more than the prices of non-tradable goods,
primarily as a result of faster productivity growth in the
tradable goods sector.  And second, declining trade tariff rates
reduced the cost of international trade and increased the
returns to production specialisation.  Together, these factors
were thought to account for over 60% of the secular increase
in world trade relative to world GDP between 1980 and 2000.
Part of the faster productivity growth in the tradable goods
sector could itself be a result of increased production
specialisation.  And of particular importance for trade flows
may have been not only specialisation by sector or product
type in the old-fashioned sense, but also through specialisation
in stages of production or ‘vertical specialisation’.  For
example, businesses in country A specialise in producing parts
of cars and businesses in country B specialise in assembling
those parts.  Cross-country differences in resources, wages and
productivity mean that businesses can benefit from sourcing
inputs from abroad and from fragmenting their production
process.
A lack of definitive data on vertical specialisation does limit
comprehensive study of this topic.  There are though a number
of partial empirical studies that do suggest increasing vertical
specialisation in recent decades.  A study by Brooks and
Hua (2008) finds that the share of components in world
machinery and transport imports rose by 3 percentage points
(to 44%) between 1990 and 2006.  In South Asia, the increase
was much more pronounced, from 47% to 63%.  Amador and
Cabral (2009) construct an index of world vertical supply
integration for 79 countries.  This measure identifies vertical
trade for each country by examining exports and related
intermediate imports for individual goods categories, relative
Chart 2 World economic activity(a)













Sources:  CPB Netherlands, IMF, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) The world industrial production and goods trade series are constructed by the
CPB Netherlands, aggregating national data using world production shares and market
exchange rates respectively.  The world GDP series was constructed by the authors,
aggregating national-level data using IMF-calculated purchasing power parity (PPP) shares,
based in 2006, and covers at least 70% of world activity.
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Source:  IMF (April 2010 World Economic Outlook).
(a) Trade series are aggregated by the IMF using market exchange rates at constant and current
prices.  GDP series is aggregated by the IMF using PPP shares.
(1) Irwin (2002) examined the long-run relationship between world trade and world
income since the 19th century and found that since the mid-1980s trade has become
more responsive to income than in previous periods.
(2) Dean and Sebastia-Barriel (2004).




Sources:  OECD and Bank calculations.
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to thresholds based upon world averages.  This metric shows
an even faster increase in vertical specialisation:  from less than
20% in 1995 to over 30% in 2005.
The proliferation of global supply chains, created by vertical
specialisation, leads to more trade flows for a given increase in
final demand for goods and services, in absolute terms.  For
example, once, a product in its lifetime might have begun as
raw materials from one or two countries, exported to another
for manufacture, and then exported once more for sale.  Now,
as global supply chains have grown, a final product might start
as raw materials exported to various countries for manufacture
into component parts, before being exported again for
assembly elsewhere, and then finally being shipped to the
purchaser — requiring more trade transactions for the same
final purchase.  And so, as final demand for goods has grown,
as measured by GDP, the gross trade flows associated with
that final demand have risen by more in absolute terms.  In
turn, when demand falls the accompanying fall in trade flows is
larger too.
Having a larger number of intermediate trade flows for every
unit of final demand explains why the absolute fall in trade
flows is larger than that in demand, but it does not explain
why the fall is proportionately larger (such that the
percentage declines in trade would be larger than the
percentage declines in GDP).  World trade did not just fall
more than GDP in absolute terms;  it fell more in
proportionate terms too.
To explain proportionately larger falls in trade, there would
need to be some aspect of the concentration of global supply
chains that makes these trade flows especially sensitive to the
fall in demand.  O’Rourke (2009)(1) used a stylised example to
reveal that trade flows can fall proportionately more than GDP
if some sectors have seen more growth in supply chains than
others, and if the shock to demand is skewed towards those
longer supply chains.
Another related argument for the role of vertical specialisation
in intensifying the trade collapse is that vertical supply chains
may have been important in transmitting the fall in demand
between countries (Yi (2009)).  All 104 nations for which the
WTO reports data experienced a drop in trade during the
second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009.(2)
This synchronised trade collapse also raised concerns about a
permanent reduction in global trade integration.  For example,
Yi (2009) suggested that the transmission of production and
demand shocks between countries might be more sensitive to
downturns because of factors such as home bias in
production, which could take a long time to reverse.  Indeed, as
trade collapsed, concerns mounted over a permanent
reduction in global trade integration.  However, the quick
rebound in world trade (Chart 2) suggests that those links
have not been broken to the extent that was feared.  Studies of
supply chains in France, Germany and Italy also indicate that
these chains may have been more resilient than anticipated.
Bricongne et al (2009) observe that large French firms
absorbed the demand shock mostly by reducing the volume
of their exports rather than ceasing trade relationships.
Altomonte and Ottaviano (2009) find similar results in
their study of supply chains between Germany, Italy and
Eastern Europe.
There is some evidence that the growth in vertical
specialisation did play at least some role in the collapse and
subsequent recovery in world trade.  Intermediate
components, which had been increasing as a share of imports
in Japan and Europe in recent decades, saw their share fall
substantially in 2009 (Chart 4).  Cheung and Guichard (2009)
find that vertical specialisation and supply chains, among other
factors, can help explain the trade collapse by incorporating
indices of vertical supply chain growth in a world trade
equation.
It is not clear though that the development of vertical
specialisation alone is enough to explain all of the unusually
large fall in world trade.  The development of vertical
specialisation has been ongoing for a number of decades, and
so should arguably be partly captured in pre-2009 trade
models.  And little analysis has been put forward to suggest
that vertical specialisation spread even more rapidly in very
recent years.  But, as discussed in section (iii), when considered
alongside other features of the trade collapse, such as the
concentration of falls in manufactured goods, the extent of
(1) O’Rourke uses a stylised example involving Barbie dolls produced via supply chains
and Ken dolls produced in one step.  With a demand shock skewed towards Barbie
dolls rather than Ken dolls, then not only does trade fall more in absolute terms, it














Sources:  Eurostat and Japan’s Ministry of Finance.
(a) Intermediate components are industrial supplies for Japan and intermediate goods for EU27.
Imports for EU27 exclude trade among the EU27 members.  Data as at 14 August 2010.
Chart 4 Shares of intermediate components in goods
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global supply chains may have been a force exacerbating the
world trade collapse.
(ii)  A collapse in trade credit supply
As world trade collapsed, the availability of the specialist trade
finance that accompanied it also received a lot of attention.
Much international trade requires some form of specific
financing given the nature of cross-border exchange and the
varying time delays between payment and receipt of goods
and services.  It is an idiosyncratic type of credit, where the
financing can take alternative forms, from letters of guarantee
provided by banks, to intra or inter-business financing, to loans
from public sector export-import banks.
If international trade relies more on credit compared with
domestic transactions, then trade may have been more
vulnerable to the dislocation in financial markets during the
crisis at the end of 2008.  There were a number of pressures
that may have caused both a fall in trade finance supply and
an increase in demand for it given trade flows.  In some cases,
increased risk aversion reportedly led to a rise in demand for
trade finance instruments intermediated by financial
institutions in place of open account-based operations, where
credit is extended by the seller to the buyer.  At the same time,
financial institutions tightened lending conditions, including
for trade finance, as a consequence of the crisis.
Whereas there is some consensus that tight credit conditions
played some role in the collapse of world trade (see section
(iii)), there is less of a consensus that trade finance itself was a
primary factor globally, even if anecdotal evidence suggests
that it did play a relatively larger role in some regions.  This
lack of consensus is partly a result of limited data availability.
Some information has been provided by the trade finance
survey developed by the IMF and the Bankers’ Association for
Finance and Trade (BAFT), which was first released in early
2009.  It asked banks in various countries questions about the
demand for and supply of trade finance instruments.  The
results suggested that the primary reason for the decline in
trade credit was reduced demand for trade activities and not
the supply of credit.  And although reduced credit availability
was cited by a majority of respondents in the first survey, this
percentage fell in the subsequent release, which covered the
period where trade fell the most (Chart 5).  In line with the
IMF-BAFT findings, a World Bank survey in developing
countries(1) concluded that although constrained trade finance
played a substantial role for small and medium-sized
enterprises, weak demand was the major reason behind the
decline in exports during the bulk of the world trade collapse,
between September 2008 and March  2009.  One caveat to
these conclusions is that these surveys have only partial
coverage, which could possibly introduce biases to the
results.(2) But they are scarce sources of timely information
about trade finance on a global level.
It is possible that these surveys do not suggest that trade
credit conditions had a large impact on world trade, in part,
because of successful public policy intervention.  At their
London meeting in April 2009, the G20 agreed on a
$250 billion support framework to expand trade finance supply
via export credit agencies and multilateral development banks.
The average utilisation rate for this support facility was initially
high, at around 70% and it fell to 40% in the second half of
2009, as supply of trade credit from private sources
increased.(3)
(iii)  A fall in demand skewed towards tradable goods
Another explanation for the collapse in world trade is that the
restriction in credit availability and loss of economic
confidence by households and businesses, triggered by the
financial crisis, may have led to a fall in global demand that
was unusually skewed towards tradable goods.  Cheung and
Guichard (2009) show that the tightening in overall credit
conditions can, in part, help explain the collapse in trade
because of a relatively larger impact on trade-intensive
sectors.
One starting point for considering whether the fall in demand
was skewed towards tradables is to consider how trade relates
to different types of expenditure.  Estimates of the correlation
between imports and different expenditure components of
final domestic demand using OECD data since 1961 suggest
that investment (or gross fixed capital formation) moves most
closely with imports (Table B).
(1) Malouche (2009).
(2) These surveys are partial in their coverage of world regions and relevant banks.  Also,
to the extent that the respondent banks only observe actual demand given the price
being charged (rather than potential demand), it could be that the reported
contribution of weak demand is overstated if part of this weakness is actually because
of tighter credit conditions.
(3) For further details see www.g20.org/exp_03.aspx.
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Source:  IMF-BAFT Trade Finance surveys.
(a) For the period between October 2008 and January 2009.  Not seasonally adjusted.
(b) For the period between 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q2.  Not seasonally adjusted.
Chart 5 Key reasons behind the decline in trade finance
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In 2009, world investment fell as a share of world GDP by over
2 percentage points, from 24% of GDP in 2008 to 21% of GDP,
compared to a long-run average of 23% of world GDP
(Chart 6).  That represented a fall of 9% in investment
compared with a fall in world GDP of 2% in 2009.  And this fall
in investment can be linked to the fall in the demand for, and
trade of, manufactured goods and machinery, which form a
large share of investment expenditure,(1) and contributed to
over half of the fall in imports in the OECD (Chart 7).  That
pattern is also consistent with the large falls in industrial
production, also dominated by manufactured goods, relative
to GDP seen during the downturn (Chart 2).
In addition to the large decline in investment, a second
characteristic of the downturn in world activity was the
presence of widespread de-stocking by businesses.
De-stocking is a normal feature of business cycles but it is
possible that the globally synchronised nature of the
downturn, and factors such as a desire by businesses to raise
cash holdings in the face of disrupted credit markets, may have
led to a particularly intense global inventory correction.  And
stocks tend to have a high import content.(2)
Falling demand for manufactured goods might have extra
potency for trade flows because of the relatively high
prevalence of cross-border supply chains in manufactured
goods as opposed to services or commodities.  Every unit fall in
final demand for manufactures leads to a greater decline in
trade on two counts:  (i) because manufactures form a high
share of tradables and (ii) because of the gross flows
associated with vertical specialisation in some manufacturing
production.
The importance of the nature of the shock to global demand in
explaining the collapse and subsequent rebound in world trade
can be demonstrated with a simple quantitative exercise.
There are a number of ways in which to consider world trade.
For this exercise, we focus directly on imports in the
United Kingdom’s main trade partners, to account for the
share of the world that is relevant for the United Kingdom.(3)
We do that by constructing a measure for world imports which
weights individual country imports by their importance in
UK exports.
In this exercise, the explanatory factors considered to explain
the path of world trade (weighted by UK export demand) were:
￿ World GDP, weighted by the share of each country in
UK export markets.
￿ Investment in the United Kingdom’s major trading partners,
the United States, euro area and Japan (which account for
70% of UK export markets) to proxy for the composition of
demand effect.
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Source:  IMF (April 2010 World Economic Outlook).
Chart 7 OECD import values by goods type(a)
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over time, percentage points
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Source:  OECD.
(a) This OECD aggregate does not include data for Canada, Chile, Greece, Mexico and Slovenia.
(b) Commodities refers to ‘mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials’ and ‘commodities and
transactions’.
(c) Manufactures includes ‘manufactured goods’, ‘machinery and transport equipment’ and
‘miscellaneous manufactured articles’.
Table B Correlation between imports and final domestic demand
expenditure components in the OECD(a)
Final domestic demand component 1961–2008
Private consumption expenditure 0.49
Government consumption expenditure -0.04
Gross fixed capital formation 0.71
Sources:  OECD and Bank calculations.
(a) Correlation coefficient on the growth rate of imports with the growth rate of domestic demand components.
(1) For example, spending on business equipment formed over 50% of US private fixed
investment and UK capital expenditure in 2008.
(2) Taking the United Kingdom as an example, stockbuilding is one of the most
trade-intensive expenditure components of GDP.
(3) We do not, however, examine the subsequent implications for UK exports or net
trade.188 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
￿ Aggregate of the change in stocks (private inventories) in the
United States and Germany.(1) This was also included to
proxy for the composition of demand effect.
As a starting point, we construct a simple mapping equation
from UK export demand to world GDP growth alone.  This
mapping captures the average relationship between trade and
GDP from the start of 1980 to the third quarter of 2008.  But
this mapping can only explain half of the fall in trade seen
between 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q2 (Chart 8).(2)
Two combined changes improve the results substantially.
First, the addition of investment and stocks measures to
capture the composition of global demand.  Second,
shortening the sample period, to cover 1995 Q1 to 2008 Q3,
to reflect the growth in vertical specialisation in recent years.
From this enhanced mapping (Chart 8), the positive
coefficients found on the stocks and investment terms suggest
that the composition of demand can help to explain the fall in
world trade and its subsequent rapid recovery.(3)
Conclusion
The fall in world trade from the end of 2008 into 2009 was
abnormally large even compared with the substantial fall in
world activity over the same period.  And those declines were
reflected directly in UK export demand.  This article has
explored the possible explanations for this collapse,
considering the interaction between the nature of the demand
shock following the financial crisis and the underlying change
in global trade patterns stemming from increasingly globalised
production processes.
Our analysis suggests that the collapse of export demand from
UK trade partners was driven largely by the effect of a fall in
demand that was particularly acute for investment
expenditure and inventories.  That investment expenditure
included considerable volumes of highly tradable capital and
durable goods;  goods that are also increasingly produced in
international supply chains.  The existence and proliferation of
these supply chains has increased trade in intermediate goods
for each unit of final demand.  This means that when there was
a fall in final demand for capital and durable goods, trade fell
by more than GDP, both because those goods form a greater
share of value added in trade than they do in GDP, and because
the intermediate components used in their production are
captured in trade flows but not in GDP.  Trade finance
conditions deteriorated sharply during the crisis, but survey
evidence suggests they played a less important role when
compared with the impact of the overall fall in demand.
The recovery in global trade from the second half of 2009 has
been encouraging, and so far stronger than that in GDP.  This
signals that even though the trade flows within global supply
chains may have fallen off rapidly during the crisis, the chains
themselves were not permanently broken.  That indicates that
world trade integration may not have been severely damaged
in the recent recession.
(1) Aggregated in US dollars at constant (2005) prices.
(2) Based on an out-of-sample forecast.  Simple equation (t-statistics):
D(Log(UK export demand)) = -0.01+2.0*D(Log(World GDP))
(-0.1)   (10.4).
(3) Long-run equation (t-statistics):
LOG(UK export demand) = -5.0+1.6*LOG(World GDP)+0.5*LOG(G3 investment)
(-81)  (25)                                                   (7)
Short-run equation (t-statistics):
D(LOG(UK export demand)) = 
0.94*D(LOG(World GDP))+0.21*D(LOG(G3INVESTMENT)) -0.40*(Long-run residual)
(-1)+0.40*D(LOG(World GDP(-1)))+0.11*(World stocks)
(2.9), (1.5), (-3.7), (1.5), (3.1).
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Sources:  ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) UK export demand is calculated by aggregating the volume of national imports weighted by
country share in UK exports (based in 2006), and covers at least 80% of UK export markets.Research and analysis Interpreting the world trade collapse 189
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